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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the urban wage premia (UWP) in Italy, with its economy char-
acterized by the interplay between collective bargaining and spatial heterogeneity in the cost
of living. We implement a reduced-form regression analysis using both nominal and real (in
temporal and spatial terms) wages. Our dataset for the 2005-2015 period includes, for workers’
characteristics, unique administrative data provided by Italian Social Security Institute and, for
the local CPI computation, housing prices collected by Italian Revenue Agency. For employ-
ees covered by collective bargaining, we find a zero UWP in nominal terms and a negative
and non-negligible UWP in real terms (-5%). To capture the role played by centralized wage
settings, we also consider various groups of self-employed workers, who are not covered by
national labour agreements, while living in the same locations and enjoying the same amenities
as employees. We find that the UWP for self-employed workers are up to 25 times greater
than for employees. Moreover, sorting proves more notable in the case of self-employed work-
ers, i.e. the larger UWP provide the higher incentives for high-skilled individuals and better
firms to locate in cities. Our findings are confirmed on extending the analysis along the wage
distribution.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature on the urban wage premium (UWP, hereafter), a well-
established issue in urban economics (Marshall, 1890; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Duranton
and Puga, 2004 among others). To this end, we emphasize the role played by the interplay of two
labour market features, somewhat neglected in the relevant works on this topic: collective wage
bargaining and spatial variability in the cost of living.
Collective bargaining, the first aspect, plays a crucial role in the labour markets of many de-
veloped countries: in the OECD economies, 155 million workers are covered by collective agree-
ments concluded at the national, regional, sectoral, occupational, or firm level. Its functioning is
set by the International Labour Organization (ILO Convention No. 98) and its impact on economic
performance, such as recruiting and dismissal strategies, wage structure and inequality, has been
analyzed in an extensive economic literature (see, e.g., OECD, 2017). The role of collective bar-
gaining schemes in shaping firms responses to economic crises has been examined by international
institutions such as the ECB, the European Commission, the IMF, and the OECD.1
However, to the best of our knowledge, the relevant literature has not investigated the effects of
collective bargaining on the spatial distribution of wages and on the estimation of UWP. This might
depend on the fact that previous research has mainly focused on the US, a country characterized by
flexible wage setting institutions, or on the lack of proper data when European countries have been
considered.
The spatial variability in the cost of living, the second aspect, has also been largely neglected
in the existing literature for both the US and Europe, again due to the paucity of data on prices at
the local level. This is a serious limitation because price levels vary greatly across the regions of
the same country and between urban and rural areas.
Collective bargaining tends to make wages uniform along the space dimension, while the cost of
living is highly heterogeneous across locations. Hence, the interplay between these two phenomena
might lead to UWP differing between real and spatial terms. This is likely to affect location choices
and sorting of firms and workers and, in turn, have an impact on firm dynamics and economic
growth, especially when cities are characterized by urbanization externalities.
As far as we know, there is only one paper, by Boeri et al. (2017), combining collective bargain-
1Mario Draghi, in an official speech in 2015, underlined that “firms with flexibility at the plant-level have reduced
employment less during the crisis than those bound by centralised wage bargaining agreements, partly because they
have been more able to adjust wages to economic conditions”, a statement based on ECB research (Draghi, 2015,
Di Mauro and Ronchi, 2016). In its 2016, 2017, and 2018 Country Reports for Italy the European commission also
expressed concern regarding collective bargaining. Similar conclusions emerge from the IMF Country Report No.
16/222 on the Italian economy, and from independent observers such as Boeri (2015).
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ing and local variability in cost of living, from both the theoretical and empirical points of view. In
their theoretical model, workers’ utility functions include nominal wages, cost of living, and unem-
ployment. One of the predictions is that, in equilibrium and in the presence of collective bargaining
(equal nominal wages across locations), the cost of living is higher in higher productivity locations
and, hence, real wages are lower. In order to derive the equality of utility functions across space,
the unemployment rate must be smaller in high productivity areas. This prediction is confirmed by
the empirical analysis applied to regional unbalances in Italy (between the South and the North)
and in Germany (between the East and the West), the former characterized by the greater rigidity
of the collective bargaining system.
As Boeri et al. (2017), we also focus on Italy, considering the agglomeration dimension rather
than comparisons across macro-regions. Agglomeration is a key feature in investigation of the
variance of Italian wages: in this country, 95.3% of the variance of nominal wages and 95.7% of
the variance of real wages is within regions (INPS data 2015, see later).
Italy represents a perfect case to study in this context. One reason is that, differently from the
US, where the high productivity areas tend to bear high costs of living and to enjoy high salaries (see
Hornbeck and Moretti, 2018), in Italy substantial differences in terms of costs of living might not
be associated with wage differences of similar size. Indeed, as in many other European countries,
a crucial component of Italian wages is set at the industry level and, hence, is uniform in the
spatial dimension (between the North and the South of the country and across big and small cities).
The Italian two-tier system is also characterized by (non-compulsory) decentralized second-level
bargaining, which plays only a minor role. Second-level bargaining is subject to the in melius or
favourability principle: workers wages and conditions cannot be worse than those agreed at the
industry level.
Another reason to consider Italy is the type and the quality of the data we can employ. First,
for workers, we can make use of unique administrative archives from the Italian National Social
Security Institute (INPS), issued through the VisitINPS programme (2015). These data cover the
universe of Italian workers, including both an employer-employee dataset, with detailed individual
and firm characteristics, and a dataset on various groups of self-employed workers. For all groups,
the INPS archives provide information on the municipality where the job is located. Second, we
make use of a very rich database on housing prices (Osservatorio del Mercato Immobiliare, OMI
hereafter) provided by Italian Revenue Agency (2015), which covers information on housing trans-
actions detailed at the municipality level.
Our empirical analysis is based on a well-established reduced-form approach for estimation of
the UWP (see, for instance, Combes et al., 2011). In particular, we use a regression analysis at the
individual level for the 2005-2015 period to estimate the UWP for both nominal and real wages.
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Individual real wages are computed by deflating nominal wages by a local CPI obtained using
local variation in housing prices, after removing composition effects, according to a procedure
developed by Moretti (2013).2 Our covariate of interest is the (log) population density of the local
labour markets (LLM) where the job is located.3
When considering nominal wages, our results confirm the presence of a negligible nominal
UWP. The wage elasticity with respect to population density is 4.6% when no controls are included,
which proves very small in international comparison. Once individual and firm level controls are
introduced, the elasticity drops to zero and becomes not statistically significant, i.e. the composition
of workers and firms differs greatly along the density distribution. The estimate of the UWP in real
terms is, instead, negative and non-negligible: urban workers suffer a penalty in terms of real wages.
In the specification that includes all possible controls for individuals’ and firms’ characteristics, the
wage elasticity with respect to population density is −5.1%.4
Consistently with the recent relevant literature, we address sorting of workers and firms into
denser areas. While sorting of workers is an established fact in urban economics (Mion and Natic-
chioni, 2009, Combes et al., 2008), the importance of firm-fixed effects in explaining wage differ-
entials is more recent (Card and Klein, 2013; Dauth et al., 2016). However, our results show that
sorting of individuals only slightly dampens the UWP estimate, and adding firm-fixed effects does
not substantially change it.
Following the theoretical prediction by Boeri et al. (2017), we also verify whether the estimated
urban wage penalty reflects a higher probability of being employed in more densely populated
areas. Our evidence does not support this conclusion: the unemployment rate does not change
much along the population density distribution, while it plays a clear role in the comparison across
macro-areas (Boeri et al., 2017).
The urban economics literature suggests that the presence of urban amenities or the idiosyn-
cratic preferences for locations are possible explanations for the existence of real wage penalties
(Moretti, 2011). In our analysis, we investigate the distinct role played by collective bargaining. To
isolate this effect, we consider various groups of self-employed workers, because, differently from
employees, they are not subject to centralized wage settings, while living in the same locations and
2From now on, we will refer to real wages in the sense of wages deflated both temporally and spatially.
3Local labour markets are self-contained areas defined with respect to daily commuting patterns. According to the
Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) classification, 611 LLM were identified in 2011.
4We also check the robustness of our results with respect to endogeneity issues due to reverse causality problems
possibly associated with productivity shocks occurring in a given location which may affect wages and, in turn, worker
location choices. This is ensured by implementing a well-established instrumental variable approach, which uses
historical series of the Italian population density as an instrument (as by Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Mion and Naticchioni,
2009; Combes et al., 2011).
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enjoying the same local amenities as employee.5 To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of
the first providing accurate separate UWP estimates for employees and self-employed workers.
Our preferred self-employed group is that of independent contractors (so-called collaborazioni
or parasubordinati). This can be considered a peculiar category of self-employed workers closely
associated with a firm, such as external staff and/or consultants, and may be either skilled or un-
skilled. Unlike those of employees, their wages are the result of market forces and individual
bargaining between employer and worker, with no institutional constraints. We find that the esti-
mated UWP for this group of workers in nominal terms, including all possible controls, is up to 25
times greater than that found for employees (around 5%). By contrast, in real terms, the UWP falls
to zero, with higher wages that, on average, offset higher costs of living. Interestingly, once worker
and firm fixed effects are included, a more pronounced drop in the UWP for independent contrac-
tors is observed than for employees. This evidence of spatial sorting represents another interesting
finding of the paper: earnings for self-employed workers react much more in the space dimension,
providing higher incentives for individuals and firms to sort into agglomerated areas.
The differences in UWP estimates between employees and self-employed workers are widely
confirmed when considering the standard self-employed workers, such as (the high-skilled) busi-
ness consultants, lawyers, physicians, and architects, (and the medium-skilled) journalists, survey-
ors, and accountants. Overall, UWP estimates are around 5% in nominal terms and zero in real
terms, very close to the estimates obtained for the group of independent contractors. More im-
portantly, by considering various groups of self-employed workers, characterized by different self-
selection processes, we provide evidence that self-selection between employees and self-employed
workers can hardly constitute the main factor in differences in the UWP estimates between the two
groups.
To sum up, our results suggest that there are significant differences in estimated UWP between
employees (covered by collective bargaining) and self-employed workers (independent contrac-
tors and standard self-employed). When controlling for all individual and firm characteristics, the
difference in UWP between the two groups, in both nominal and real terms, is around 5% (in nom-
inal terms, the UWP is 5% for self-employed and zero for employees; in real terms, it is zero for
self-employed and −5.1% for employees). Collective bargaining can be considered a driving force
behind such differences in the presence of heterogeneity in the cost of living, since workers in the
two groups enjoy the same amenities and live in the same locations. Nonetheless, the way such fac-
5Note that an additional advantage of investigating the local rather than the macro-regional dimension is that it
allows us to neglect structural and cultural differences across units of observation. They would, instead, be relevant
when comparing the South and the North of Italy, as in Boeri et al. (2017). By contrast, within-region local differences
could be considered negligible.
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tors enter the utility functions of, respectively, employees and self-employed workers might have a
role in explaining the different equilibria for the two groups. For instance, the fact that real UWP
are negative and substantial for employees suggests that individuals with strong preferences for ur-
ban amenities are willing to suffer a wage penalty to live in cities. A different equilibrium applies
to self-employed workers, for whom weaker preferences for urban facilities are required, given the
higher UWP, to induce the marginal worker to move to a city.
In the last part of the paper, we investigate how incentives in location choices may vary along
the wage distribution, e.g. between skilled and unskilled workers, by employing unconditional
quantile regressions. One might expect decentralized (second-level) bargaining at the firm/local
level to affect workers at the tails of the wage distribution. On the one hand, high-skilled employees
might be able to extract higher wages in decentralized negotiations, and this could be more likely
to occur in agglomerated areas where firms are more productive. On the other hand, if unions at the
firm/local level were mostly interested in the welfare of low-wage workers, second-level bargaining
could increase wages for unskilled workers (Matano and Naticchioni, 2017). Our results show that
this is not the case: UWP differences between employees and self-employed workers observed at
the conditional mean are also found along different percentiles of the wage distribution, suggesting
that second-level decentralized bargaining is not playing a major role in Italy, consistently with
findings by Boeri (2015).
Finally, an array of robustness checks are performed and previous conclusions are, again, widely
confirmed. First, we focus on a number of distinct categories of workers. Second, we change
our measure of earnings and use yearly wages rather than weekly wages. Third, we change the
spatial unit of observation and move from LLM to municipalities. Fourth, we employ different
agglomeration measures: employment density and binary dummies for urban areas. Fifth, we use
two alternative measures of local CPI: a CPI computed without removing compositional housing
effects, as we do in the main analysis, and a CPI based on the official absolute poverty thresholds
provided by Istat (Istat, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss
the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to our analysis. Section 3 describes the data and
the variables used in the empirical investigation, while Section 4 offers some descriptive evidence.
Section 5 and 6 present, respectively, the econometric strategy and the empirical results. Sections
7 and 8 investigate the role of collective wage bargaining, while Section 9 offers an analysis based
on unconditional quintile regressions. Section 10 provides a wide range of robustness checks and
Section 11 draws concluding remarks.
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2 Related literature
The theoretical literature has identified various possible explanations for the presence of a (nomi-
nal) wage premium to urban workers. First, the so-called urbanization externalities are the result
of efficiency gains and cost savings for firms located in areas of dense economic activity due to
proximity to consumers and suppliers and to knowledge and technology spillovers among firms
(Marshall, 1890; Glaeser, 1998; Kim, 1987; Ciccone and Hall, 1996). Second, learning mecha-
nisms are related to the fact that in cities human capital accumulation tends to be faster than in rural
areas (Shapiro, 2006;Glaeser, 1999; Moretti, 2004). Third, matching effects could be generated by
the fact that location in cities enhances the probability of a better match between workers and firms
(Zenou, 2009; Kim, 1990), this probability increasing with the time spent in cities (Yankow, 2006).
Finally, sorting effects imply that the best workers and firms tend to have higher probabilities of
locating in urban areas (Combes et al., 2008; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009).
As already mentioned, due to the paucity of data on prices at the local level, most of the ex-
isting empirical literature has analyzed the UWP in nominal terms, and hence assuming a uniform
cost of living across locations. But, for many countries, this assumption is unrealistic, due to the
considerable variability in the cost of living across regions in the same nation, between cities and
countryside, and across groups of municipalities of different sizes. There are few exceptions. For
the US, some papers have shown, mainly with descriptive evidence, that when taking into account
the spatial heterogeneity in the cost of living the UWP decreases or even tends to zero. Dumond
et al. (1999), employing the cost of living indexes provided by the American Chamber of Commerce
Research Association (ACCRA), estimate the real wage differentials across cities of different sizes.
Glaeser and Mare (2001), also using ACCRA indexes, document that the UWP declines markedly
in real spatial terms, as also confirmed by Yankow (2006). However, the ACCRA indexes entail
a number of practical difficulties and limitations (they include only six components of the cost
of living, are collected for metropolitan areas but not for rural areas, and are not available for all
metropolitan areas).
As for the US, Moretti (2013) derives a finer local consumer price index to study the evolution
of real wage inequalities between college and high school graduates. His methodology consists in
exploiting variation in housing costs across metropolitan areas to compute the local CPI that is used
to deflate wages. In his paper, however, the author does not investigate agglomeration dynamics and
does not address the issue of collective bargaining. Also employing Moretti (2013)’s methodology
to compute the local CPI for the US, Hornbeck and Moretti (2018) find that, when a city enjoys
productivity gains in manufacturing, local employment and average earnings tend to increase. For
renters, increased earnings are largely offset by higher costs of living. The combination of direct
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and indirect effects implies that the 1980-1990 TFP growth heightened the purchasing power of the
average worker by about 0.5-0.6% per year between 1980 and 2000.
As for Europe, only Blien et al. (2009) compare nominal and real wage differentials between
cities and rural areas in Western Germany making use of estimated price levels at the regional level.
They find that, when controlling for a large set of variables, the real urban premium disappears.
However, their paper, too, fails to explicitly consider the role of collective bargaining.
As far as we know, the only attempt to investigate the interaction between spatial heterogeneity
in the cost of living and collective bargaining in the determination of the UWP is offered by Boeri
et al. (2017). Their baseline model assumes constant labour supply, perfect labour mobility, and
homogeneous propensities for locations. The utility function incorporates a trade-off between real
wages, the ratio of nominal wages out of local prices, and unemployment. For simplicitys sake,
it is assumed that housing prices are proportional to the region population. Finally, total factor
productivity (TFP) is allowed to differ across regions. The authors show that, in the presence
of competitive labour markets, there is no unemployment, and nominal wages and employment
are higher (lower) in regions with higher (lower) TFP. Since the cost of living is higher where
employment and TFP are higher, real wages are constant in the space dimension and this guarantees
equilibrium, i.e. workers are indifferent across regions. Collective bargaining is introduced into the
model by imposing equal nominal wages across locations and at a higher level than the competitive
one. In this framework, employment is also higher in the high TFP regions, entailing a higher
cost of living and, ceteris paribus, a lower real wage. Hence, to achieve the equality of utilities
across locations, the unemployment rate has to adjust, i.e. it increases in lower productivity areas.
According to this model, the winners are workers employed in low productivity locations and house
owners in high productivity locations.
In their empirical analysis, Boeri et al. (2017) study wage differentials across macro-regions
in Italy and Germany, with the former characterized by greater rigidity in the collective bargaining
system. Employing a local CPI index a´ la Moretti (2013), they find that the unbalances between the
North and the South of Italy are much more pronounced than those between the East and the West
of Germany, due to the fact that in Germany the collective bargaining system has been reformed
and relaxed over the last few decades. Consistently with the model, real wages are lower in the
North of Italy and unemployment is higher in the South. However, Boeri et al. (2017) do not deal
with agglomeration issues, since they are more interested in comparisons across macro-regions.
Our paper also concerns the debate on the degree of centralization of collective bargaining
and its effects on labour market performance (OECD, 1994). More recently, some papers have
questioned the superiority of two-tier multi-employer systems with respect to centralized ones in
coping with the impact of the Great Recession (see Di Mauro and Ronchi, 2016; Draghi, 2015;
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Boeri, 2015 and country reports by European Commission and IMF). Making comparison among
two-tier, fully centralized, and fully decentralized regimes, Boeri (2015) stresses the role played by
plant-level bargaining and the importance of wage floors provided by statutory minimum wages.
Finally, one more strand of literature relevant to this paper concerns the role of urban ameni-
ties, which may be unbalanced in the space dimension (Roback, 1982 and Albouy, 2016). Albouy
(2016) reports adjusted amenity-value estimates for the US indicating that households pay sub-
stantially to live in areas with coastal proximity, mild temperatures, and sunshine. Preferences
for artificial amenities are in general weak, but are relatively stronger for culture, restaurants, and
clean air. Similar arguments apply to the case of Italy. One might argue that larger cities are char-
acterized by well-known monuments, beautiful city centres, and attractive entertainment services
(restaurants, theaters, cinemas). Besides, one might expect the quality of certain public goods,
such as education and health care, to be higher in cities than in rural areas. Hence, workers living
in cities could be willing to pay the cost of lower real wages to enjoy better amenities. This finding
emerges in standard models of agglomeration economies, as for instance shown by Moretti (2011).
Similar arguments could apply when taking into account idiosyncratic preferences for locations.
3 Data and variables’ description
In order to estimate UWP in Italy, we exploit three different sets of information: the first concerns
workers’ wages and personal characteristics as well as firm level variables; the second covers prices
at the local level; and the third is about local economic and demographic variables.
3.1 Individual and firm level variables
Individual and firm level data are drawn from administrative employer-employee datasets collected
by INPS and, more specifically, obtained through the VisitINPS programme, launched by Tito Boeri
(INPS President) in 2015, which allows selected researchers to access richer data than previous
INPS issues on the universe of Italian workers.6 These can be distinguished in two macro-groups:
employees and self-employed workers. The former are employees subject to national collective
labour agreements (additional details on the role of collective bargaining in Italy and its function-
ing are provided in Appendix A). The latter are not subject to centralized wage negotiation and
comprise a heterogeneous group of individuals: independent contractors (so-called collaborazioni,
such as external staff and/or consultants) and standard self-employed workers belonging to pro-
fessional associations (those with tertiary degree education, such as business consultants, lawyers,
6For further information about the program see http://www.inps.it/nuovoportaleinps/default.aspx?itemdir=47212.
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physicians, architects, and those with upper secondary education, such as journalists, surveyors,
accountants). The data structure for these groups is similar to that for employees, and the few
differences will be highlighted in the relevant Sections 7 and 8.
For employees, at the individual level, we can exploit a wide range of variables: weekly wages,
age, gender, occupation, and information on the type of contract (part time versus full time, tem-
porary versus permanent). In the case of multiple contracts associated with the same individual,
we keep the contract which pays the highest earnings. At the firm level, we have the municipality
where the job is located (since 2005), firm size, and type of National Collective Labour Agreement
(NCLA, hereafter).
We focus on males only, to overcome issues with labour market participation. Our sample
reaches around around 77 million observations of males aged 15-64 over the 2005-2015 period for
a total of around 10 million workers.7
We employ both nominal and real wages. The former is the gross weekly wage at the individual
level (full-time equivalent wage for part-timers);8 the latter the nominal wage deflated by the local
CPI disaggregated at the local level computed as described in Subsection 3.2 (further details are
also provided in Appendix C). In our main analysis, the spatial unit of observation is the LLM
(there are 611 LLM in Italy and 8,000 municipalities). This choice is guided by the fact that we
have knowledge only of the municipality where people work, but not of the municipality where
they live. The workers’ cost of living depends on prices of the municipality of work, on prices
of that of residence, as well as on prices of the surrounding municipalities where, for instance,
they go to restaurants and cinemas, and use health and education services. Hence, employing the
municipality of work as statistical unit of observation would lead us to estimate the local cost of
living imprecisely. On the contrary, by adopting the LLM where the job is located as spatial unit of
observation, we maximize the probability of assigning to the worker a more appropriate local cost
of living.
7We crop outliers in the wage distribution and, for each year, we drop observations in the two 0.5% tails. Fur-
thermore, we drop municipalities that represent outliers with regard to prices, such as particularly touristic places (e.g.
Cortina D’Ampezzo, Capri, etc.). Finally, we do not consider the few cases regarding national contracts with less than
500 employees in the overall 2005-2015 period, for which identification of the national contract dummy would prove
imprecise.
8INPS archives provide information concerning the individual percentage of part-time with respect of full-time
workers.
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3.2 Local consumer price index
In Italy, Istat releases local consumer price index data in the capital cities of 80 out of 103 Italian
provinces (see Istat 2016b).9 Prices are aggregated according to COICOP industrial classifica-
tion,10 each category being weighted according to the Istat weighting scheme which reflects the
relative importance of the various goods and services in families’ consumption basket.11
As also stressed by Boeri et al. (2017), this price index is not adequate for our purposes to
compute real wages for two reasons: first, it is measured at the province (and not LLM or municipal)
level and, second, the weight attached to the housing costs in CPI aggregation only reflects their
direct effect on the families’ cost of living and does not take into account their attraction (indirect)
effect on the dynamics of non-housing prices.
The direct effect reflects the cost of having an accommodation and maintaining it. The indirect
effect captures the fact that the prices of the other goods and services can also be influenced by the
housing prices. This implies that in cities where land is more expensive, the cost of many goods
and services will also be higher. For example, a slice of pizza or a haircut are likely to be more
expensive in Rome than in a rural village, because operating a pizza restaurant or a barbers shop
in Rome is more expensive (higher rents and housing costs, for instance). In order to give local
housing prices their correct weight in the family consumption basket, these two effects (direct and
indirect) should be captured by the weight attached to them in the CPI aggregation. Relying on
Moretti (2011)’s methodology, we implement a two-step strategy (for details, see Appendix C), as
follows.
The first consists in estimating the “adjusted” weight of housing costs, including both direct and
indirect effects, which we will denote by β . In our analysis, the estimated “adjusted” weight, βˆ , for
the 2004-2015 period comes to 33% as opposed to the official weight attached to housing costs by
Istat, which is 10% for the same period. The second step, employing βˆ , consists in computing the
local CPI by exploiting the local variation in the housing prices. Accordingly, the CPI at the LLM
level is defined as follow:
ˆCPIlt = βˆHPIlt +(1− βˆ )NHPIt , (1)
where HPIlt is the housing price index in LLM l and in year t and NHPIt is the national non-
housing price index, both indexes with base year 2005. The CPI at the LLM level is obtained as
9A province is an intermediate administrative division between a municipality and a region.
10For instance, the one-digit level identifies macro-categories of goods and services, such as food and non-alcoholic
drinks (01), alcoholic drinks and tobacco (02), apparel and shoes (03), housing (04), and so on.
11In particular, we use the index computed for blue and white-collar households (FOI). The results would not change
were we to use the index for the whole nation (NIC) instead.
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a population-weighted average of the municipality index. Housing price indexes and non-housing
price indexes in (1) are drawn from two different sources.
The former (HPIlt) are obtained from the OMI (Osservatorio del Mercato Immobiliare) dataset,
collected by Italian Revenue Agency (2015).12 This very rich source of information provides house
property prices detailed by semester (January-June/July-December), city district (central, semi-
central, peripheral, suburban, and extra-urban), type of house (cottage, expensive house, standard
house, cheap house, typical house), and house status (good, standard, poor). The housing price data
employed in our CPI computation procedure are then purged of composition effects and converted
into index numbers with base year 2005, as explained in greater detail in Appendix C. A discussion
on the Italian housing market and the role of public housing policies is also provided in Appendix
B.
Our local CPI index is not an official measure of the local cost of living, and its variability
depends mostly on the housing cost heterogeneity in the space dimension. It could be argued
that this index represents an imprecise measure of local CPI and could either underestimate or
overestimate the actual unobserved local CPI. On the one hand, it may be that individuals working
in cities react to the higher cost of living consuming less than (or in different ways from what) they
would do if working in rural areas (e.g. living in a more modest flat). In this case, our local CPI
might overestimate the actual cost of living. On the other hand, Combes et al. (2016) point out that
the elasticity of urban costs increases more than proportionally with a city population. Should the
CPI measure not capture this non-linearity, it would underestimate the real cost of living in cities.
For these reasons, we carry out several robustness checks on the local CPI. Among other things
(see Section 10), we also employ, as an alternative measure of prices, Istat official absolute poverty
thresholds (Istat, 2017).
3.3 Urban agglomeration variables
Our proxy of urban agglomeration is population density (POPDENS) at the local level: LLM in the
baseline estimates and municipality in a robustness check. This is defined as population per square
kilometre (in line with: Combes, 2000, Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, Matano and Naticchioni,
2012, and De Blasio and Di Addario, 2005). Alternatively, we also employ as robustness check the
employment density and binary variables for urban areas (see Section 10). Data on municipality
population and city size in square kilometres are from Istat (2016c). Finally, in the instrumental
12For robustness, we also estimate β by employing Istat data on housing rents and other housing costs (Istat, 2016b)
rather than house property prices as a measure of housing costs. In this exercise, the estimated β turns out to be 54%,
which is even greater than the “adjusted” weight found for housing property prices.
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variable estimation (discussed in Section 5), we also employ municipal population back in 1871
provided by Istat (2016c).
4 Descriptive analysis: local CPI, prices, and wages
This section presents some descriptive evidence on the three key variables of the paper - local CPI,
agglomeration density, and (nominal and real) wages - and how they relate.
To start with, Figure 1 displays local (LLM level) CPI on the vertical axis and population
density on the horizontal axis, whereas local population size is represented by the dimensions of
the circles. The evidence gathered is clear: the CPI increases with population density and larger
cities (greater circles’ dimension) are characterized by higher CPI.
Figure 1 about here.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of local CPIs along the Italian map by LLM, using quintiles
of the local CPI indexes. As can be seen, the local CPI is highly heterogeneous in the spatial
dimension, with a clear North-South divide, local CPI being higher in the North than in the South.
This is a well-known phenomenon in Italy, addressed by Boeri et al. (2017). Nonetheless, a clear
agglomeration pattern also emerges: in highly agglomerated areas, the local CPI is greater and falls
in the highest quintile. This occurs in both the North and the South and, namely, in the LLMs of
Rome, Naples, Milan, Bologna, Florence, Venice, Palermo, Cagliari, and Bari.
Figure 2 about here.
Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of population and employment density across LLMs,
also in quintiles. From this figure, we can see that the distributions of the two variables are very
similar. It follows that using either of the two indexes as agglomeration measure is likely to lead to
similar results (as will be shown in Section 10).
Figure 3 about here.
We now move to the descriptive analysis of our main wage variables, weekly nominal and real
wages of employees.
Table 1 shows the within-between variance decomposition of nominal and real wages. It turns
out that (for both) around 95% of the variance is due to a within-region dimension, regardless
of whether the within dimension refers to macro-regions (5), regions (20), or provinces (103).
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This evidence brings out the importance of analyzing the variability of wages across local areas
(municipalities or LLMs).
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of nominal and real wages by quintiles of population den-
sity in 2005. It is worth noting that, while the overall means of nominal and real wages are the
same, the distributions by quintiles are strikingly different. Nominal wages are increasing along
the quintile distribution, as expected, while real wages are much more compressed: low population
density areas are characterized by higher real than nominal wages, while the opposite holds for
areas of high population density. For instance, in the top quintile, the weekly wage amounts to 511
euro in nominal terms and 443 euro in real terms. By contrast, in the lowest quintile real wages are
446 euro, the nominal wage 401 euro.
Table 1 about here.
Table 2 about here.
Figure 4 depicts the distribution of nominal (left panel) and real (right panel) wages in 2005.
The North-South divide is clear-cut as far as nominal wages are concerned. Again, we find a marked
agglomeration pattern: higher wages tend to characterize LLMs where big cities are located (Milan,
Rome, Naples, Bari, Palermo, Florence, Bologna, etc.). On turning to real wages, the North-South
divide is less evident and higher wages (darker areas) are more often located in the Center and in
the South than when nominal wages are considered. Interestingly, LLMs including large cites tend
to display much lower real than nominal wages, suggesting a reduction in purchasing power for
workers in highly agglomerated areas (for instance, Rome, Naples and Florence).
Figure 4 about here.
The descriptive evidence gathered so far provides a preview of the results which we will be
presenting in the rest of the paper: first, the local CPI is highly heterogeneous across areas and
clearly increases with population density; second, the distribution of real wages along the space
dimension is much more compressed than that of nominal wages.
5 The econometric strategy
To estimate the UWP, we make use of standard reduced-form wage regressions, in line with a
well-established tradition in the urban economics literature. In particular, when using the universe
of employees, we regress the logarithm of weekly (nominal or real) wages on population density
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and a series of individual and firm-level control variables. The spatial unit of observation is the
LLM, as already pointed out. In the robustness checks, we replicate our analysis also employing
municipalities (see Section 10).
Our baseline equation regression is as follows:
log(Wilt) = α+ρlog(POPDENSlt)+η1Xilt +η2Z jlt +δt +θp+(λi+µ j)+ εilt (2)
where log(Wilt) is the logarithm of the real or nominal wage of individual i working in LLM l at
time t, log(POPDENSlt) is the logarithm of the population density in LLM l at time t. The vector
of individual controls, Xilt , includes, for worker i in LLM l at time t: having a part-time contract,
having a fixed-term contract, occupation dummies (blue collar, white collar, manager, apprentice,
executive), and annual dummies for age. The vector of firm-level controls, Z jlt , includes, for firm j
in LLM l at time t: firm size (in log) and dummies for the associated NCLA (around 250 dummies),
which capture the enforcement of the centralized national wage setting.13 δt are year fixed effects,
which control for business cycle shocks affecting all workers, and θp are province fixed effects,
which control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across provinces.14 Regression model
(2) is estimated by OLS and ρ̂ is the estimate of the wage elasticity to agglomeration, i.e. the urban
wage premium (doubling population density increases wages by ρ).
We also consider the role of unobserved heterogeneity of workers, a well-known issue in urban
economics (Mion and Naticchioni, 2009; Combes et al., 2008). To deal with this issue the literature
has mainly used fixed effect estimations, which capture individual unobserved heterogeneity and
its correlation with the variables of interest. Hence, in some specifications, we include individual
fixed effects, λi. The importance of firm fixed effects in explaining wage differentials is a more
recent concern. Card and Klein (2013) have pointed out that workplace heterogeneity is one of the
main drivers of the increasing inequality in the case of Germany; Dauth et al. (2016) show that
sorting of firms applies also in a spatial dimension and its impact on wage inequality increases over
time. Consistently, we add firm fixed effects, µ j, in some of our regressions as in the two-way fixed
effects AKM models (Aboud et al., 1999).
A further point is that population density could be endogenous to wages. For example, there
could be a matter of reverse causality: a positive productivity shock in an LLM increases wages and
this increase in wages attracts workers, thereby boosting population density. To address this, we
adopt an instrumental variables approach. In the relevant literature, it is common to adopt historical
series of population density as instruments, such as in Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Mion and
13Using industry dummies instead of NCLA dummies does not alter our main findings. The results are available on
request.
14We adopt 1974 Istat classification as in INPS archives.
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Naticchioni (2009). In accordance with this methodology, we use as instrument population density
dating back to 1871, computed using population data in 1871 provided by Istat (Istat, 2016c). The
underlying intuition is that these values are closely correlated with current population density, but
are likely to be uncorrelated with current local shocks. Furthermore, recent surveys in the urban
economics literature, such as Combes et al. (2011), have shown that, from an empirical point of
view, endogeneity is not a major issue in this context, since IV estimates usually confirm OLS ones.
For this reason, we will carry out IV estimates only for our baseline specification.
6 Main regression results
Table 3 shows the OLS regression results at the LLM level for the universe of male Italian employ-
ees. Estimates obtained using nominal and real wages respectively are shown in columns (1)-(3)
and (4)-(6). In column (1), only the main covariate of interest, LLM population density, is included,
along with time dummies that control for the business cycle. The corresponding estimated elastic-
ity amounts to 4.6, which means that doubling the population density increases nominal wages by
4.6%. This suggests that the agglomeration effect in the Italian labour market is positive and sta-
tistically significant, but very mild, since a comparable estimate for the US labour market ranges
between 20% and 35% (Glaeser and Mare, 2001, and Yankow, 2006).
In column (2), we show the results after introducing worker’s observable characteristics in es-
timation: having a part-time contract, having a fixed term contract, age, occupation, and province
dummies.15 As can be seen, controlling for worker observable characteristics dampens the elas-
ticity to 0.6%. In column (3), we add firm level observable characteristics, such as (log) firm size
and NCLA dummies (called FULL OLS specification from now on). The wage elasticity to urban
agglomeration comes very close to zero, amounting to 0.2%, and not statistically significant. This
suggests that the positive estimated UWP shown in column (1) is only driven by the composition
of the labour force and firm population along the space dimension.
Turning to real wages, the UWP estimated without controlling for firm and worker character-
istics, displayed in column (4), is very close to zero (equal to −0.006) and not statistically signif-
icant. When adding individual controls, as we do in column (5), the estimated UWP is negative
(−0.041) and highly statistically significant: individuals working in agglomerated areas suffer a
wage penalty in real terms. Introducing observable firm characteristics, as shown in column (6),
increases the wage penalty to 5.1%.
15In Section 10, we also run a robustness check in which we introduce the more demanding specification using
LLM fixed effects, applying the two-step methodology suggested by Combes et al. (2008) and we obtain consistent
results.
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Table 3 about here.
One might think that worker heterogeneity, mainly in terms of the worker’s occupation, could
play a role in the UWP estimation: consistently with the literature, UWP are supposed to be larger
for high-skilled workers, who are more likely to benefit from agglomeration externalities. To inves-
tigate on this, Table 4 shows results from baseline regressions estimated separately for blue-collar
employees, white-collar employees, and managers/executives. Interestingly, we find, on the one
hand, that in FULL OLS, the nominal UWP for white collar workers and manager/executives is
higher than that obtained for blue collars (1.4% vs zero). On the other hand, when going on to
real wages the UWP is still negative and substantial for all groups, and comes at about 5% (the
lowest penalty is still for white collar worker, 4.5%). Hence, we can confidently state that our main
findings (small nominal wage premia and strong real wage penalties for urban employees) do not
depend on the workers’ occupations, since they apply to the various subgroups of workers.16
Table 4 about here.
6.1 Worker and firm sorting and endogeneity issues
In this section, we investigate the role played by sorting of workers and firms and address matters
of endogeneity. Column (1) of Table 5 reports our estimation output after introducing individual
fixed effects (this is referred to as the FE specification hereafter). By comparing these results with
those set out in column (3) of Table 3, we can note slight changes in the point estimates of the
UWP, from 0.2% to zero, both not statistically significant. In column (2) of Table 5, we present
our estimates when employing both individual and firm fixed effects (AKM specification). The
estimated UWP still proves very close to zero, at 0.2%, and becomes statistically significant at the
10% level. Similar conclusions are obtained when considering real wages: introducing individual
and firm fixed effects does not change the UWP point estimate much with respect to the FULL
OLS specification, as can be seen in column (6) of Table 3.
The evidence offered by fixed effects and AKM estimates, for both nominal and real wages,
reveals that sorting of workers and firms is not playing a major role in the determination of the
UWP of employees, and that most of the wage variation across space is due to observable worker
and firm characteristics.
Finally, we turn to addressing the matters of endogeneity and implement IV estimates. As
an instrument for population density, we employ LLM population density in 1871. The results
16Heterogeneity of workers characteristics will also be addressed in Section 9 by using unconditional quantile
regressions, with results consistent with those presented here.
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obtained after including individual fixed effects are displayed in column (3) and (6) of Table 5 for
respectively nominal and real wages (IV-FE). The instrument used in the estimation is not weak,
as suggested by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk statistics (see Kleibergena and Paap, 2006). Again,
the elasticity of nominal wages to the agglomeration measure is very close to zero, whereas that
of real wages becomes greater, pointing at a non-negligible increase in the real penalty for urban
employees.
Table 5 about here.
6.2 UWP and unemployment: is there a compensation mechanism?
In Boeri et al. (2017)’s model the real penalty suffered by employees in high productivity areas
is offset by a higher employment probability: the North (South) of Italy is associated with lower
(higher) real wages and higher (lower) employment rates. To verify whether this mechanism also
applies to areas with different agglomeration size, we collect data on employment and unemploy-
ment rates provided by Istat (2016a) at the LLM level for the period 2006-2015.17
Figure 5 displays the correlation between the unemployment rate in 2006 and (log) population
density: the unemployment rate proves slightly increasing with population density, suggesting that
workers in cities could be penalized in terms of both real wages (as found before) and (in addi-
tion) probability of finding a job. One might think that inactivity rates differ between agglomerated
and non-agglomerated areas, and for several reasons (for instance, universities are only located
in medium-big cities). This is confirmed by the relationship between employment rate and (log)
population density, displayed in Figure 6: the employment rate is flat along the space dimension,
i.e. inactivity is lower in cities. Hence, even considering the employment rate, there is no evi-
dence that the negative UWP computed in real terms for employees can be offset by higher (lower)
employment (unemployment) probabilities.
Figure 5 about here.
Figure 6 about here.
Going on, now, from descriptive evidence to more rigorous econometric specification, we esti-
mate our models (FULL OLS and FE) for nominal and real wages, respectively, after introducing
the LLM unemployment rate as an additional control. Table 6 shows that results are consistent with
the descriptive evidence reported above: adding the unemployment rate to our baseline specifica-
tions does not influence our estimates of the UWP, suggesting that this variable is not correlated
17Data for 2005 are not available for the classification of LLM issued in 2011, which we use here.
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with our covariate of interest (population density) and hence does not offset the real wage penal-
ties suffered by individuals working in more densely populated areas. Hence, in the subsequent
sections, we explore possible alternative forces driving our results.18
Table 6 about here.
7 Identifying the role of collective bargaining: the independent
contractors
Pulling together our results so far, we can conclude that, as far as employees are concerned, Italian
nominal UWP are very close to zero, whereas real UWP are negative and substantial in magnitude
(−5.1%). These results are at odds with the previous evidence found in the existing literature for
the US (again, see Glaeser and Mare, 2001 and Yankow, 2006). Once the role of the unemployment
rate as a possible driving force has been excluded, some remaining explanations are in order: the
collective bargaining system prevailing in the Italian labour market coupled with cost of living
heterogeneity, the presence of urban amenities and idiosyncratic preferences for locations.
To disentangle the main mechanism underlying our results, we then turn to alternative cate-
gories of workers, who potentially live in the same locations as employees, while being subject to
a different wage-setting scheme. In this section, we focus on a self-employed group of workers,
namely independent contractors. The relevant labour contract was introduced in the Italian labour
market in 1997, and can be considered as a self-employed worker that is associated with a firm, as
in the case of employees. For this reason, this category of workers has been chosen for comparison
with employees. Independent contractors are always temporary and may perform a wide range of
tasks, either unskilled or skilled (e.g. statutory auditor, company administrator, legal representa-
tive of the firms, external staff and/or consultancy). Furthermore, and importantly for our purposes,
there are no institutional constraints to wage setting, which turn out to depend largely on bargaining
between employer and worker.
Our analysis applied to this group of workers also considers the 2005-2015 period and covers
male workers aged 18-64, for the sake of comparison with the results shown for employees. For
18Note that another adjustment channel in the Italian labour market is the presence of informal workers. Nonethe-
less, while in the North-South divide this issue can be crucial, in the agglomeration (within province) dimension its
role may be deemed marginal. Indeed, we might well assume that, within a province, the incentives by firms to resort
to informal workers are homogeneous across space, depending also on additional factors working at the local level,
such as social norms, monitoring activities by the police and tribunals at the provincial level, etc. The province fixed
effects included in our regressions should largely capture this phenomenon.
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independent contractors, the INPS archives provide us with information on gross worker compen-
sation and length of contract (in days). We can then compute a standardized measure of earnings,
the daily wage. In addition, the archives include information on the worker age, the industrial sec-
tor corresponding to the firm with which the worker is associated, the municipality, and the LLM
where he/she works. Furthermore, for administrative reasons, it is possible to identify some sub-
groups of independent contractors, among whom we consider the most relevant in terms of size and
type of tasks: the skilled group, which includes statutory auditors, company administrators, and le-
gal representatives, and the external staff, which could be associated with either public or private
employers.19 We select one observation per worker per year and, as in the case of employees, we
choose to keep the contract with the highest earnings paid to the worker. We also crop the tails of
the distributions of, respectively, earnings and contract lengths (1% at the bottom and at the top of
each distribution).
In Table 7, we present estimates of the UWP for the universe of independent contractors. For the
sake of comparison, we employ specifications as close as possible to those used for employees (see
Table 3). The dependent variable is either nominal or real daily wage, the latter being computed
with the same local CPI adopted for employees.
Table 7 about here.
Column (1) of Table 7 displays our results for daily nominal wages when age dummies, industry
dummies (associated with industrial sectors according to 2-digit Ateco classification20), dummies
for categories of independent contractors,21 province fixed effects, and year fixed effects are in-
cluded (FULL OLS): the estimated wage elasticity turns out at 4.9%, which is almost 25 times
greater than the corresponding estimate for employees (see column (3) of Table 3), which was not
even statistically different from zero.
To consider the role of workers’ sorting, in column (2) we include, in addition to controls for
workers’ and firms’ characteristics, worker fixed effects. We obtain a substantial drop in the point
estimate that comes to 1.1%, still considerably larger than the corresponding estimate found for
19Note that these groups represent 90% of the total contracts of independent contractors; the biggest groups are the
skilled workers (about 45%) and the external staff of private firms (around 40%).
20Ateco classification (ATtivit ECOnomiche) is the industrial classification adopted by Istat and represents the Ital-
ian version of NACE industrial classification employed by Eurostat. The current version is Ateco 2007 that corresponds
to NACE Rev. 2.
21They are statutory auditors (company administrators, and legal representatives), editorial collaborators, member
of boards and commissions, administrators of local authorities, project contractors (external staff of private employers),
door-to-door salesmen, temporary (casual) contractors, independent temporary (casual) contractors, project contractors
for retired workers, external staff for public employers, extended contracts for external staff, profit sharing contractors,
specialized trainees, coordinated and continuing collaboration. As pointed out, the three major groups cover more than
90% of the sample, the remainder being residual.
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employees (see column (1) of Table 5). It is also worth noting that the drop in the point estimate
from FULL OLS to FE (from column (1) to column (2)) is much greater for independent contrac-
tors than for employees, suggesting that sorting plays a more important role for the first group of
workers. This is an interesting result, since higher spatial variability of earnings for self-employed
workers, due to the absence of collective bargaining, provides a higher incentive for individuals
to sort in space, with respect to employees. When carrying out the AKM specification, in column
(3), the UWP point estimate drops even more, to 0.8%, documenting that even firm sorting is more
notable for independent contractors than for employees.
We then move on to the analysis of the daily real wages. As shown in column (5) of Table 7, in
the FULL OLS specification the estimated UWP proves very close to zero (equal to −0.14%) and
not statistically significant. This is remarkable given the substantial real penalty that was found for
employees when adopting the same specification (see column (6) of Table 3). Again, introducing
individual fixed effects, as in column (6), substantially dampens the point estimate of the wage
elasticity, to−5.5%, confirming that for independent contractors sorting is much more pronounced
than for employees. The AKM estimate, shown in column (7), is slightly greater, amounting to
−5.7%.
Finally, the IV-FE estimates, listed in column (4) and (8) respectively for nominal and real
wages, follow patterns similar to those observed for employees: in nominal terms the point estimate
is slightly greater than that obtained after including worker and firm fixed effects, while for real
wages the negative point estimate becomes larger in absolute terms. The regressions shown in
Table 5 do not include firm size, since this variable is missing in around 20% of the sample of
independent contractors. Consistent conclusions are found when we also control for firm size on
the restricted sample, as we do in Table 8.
Table 8 about here.
Table 9 presents the results obtained by replicating our regressions for distinct subgroups of
independent contractors. This is relevant to our analysis because of the high heterogeneity in terms
of skills within this group of workers heterogeneity that can only partially be captured with the
introduction of subgroup fixed effects.
Table 9 about here.
The top panel considers workers performing high-skill job tasks (statutory auditors, company
administrators, legal representatives). Interestingly, as far as nominal wages in FULL OLS are
concerned (column (1)), the estimated UWP is even larger (around 6%) than that found for the
21
overall group. The middle panel refers to estimates obtained when we consider the group of external
staff of private firms, with a point estimates of 3.1%. Finally, the bottom panel focuses on the
group of workers with a contract as external staff for the public administrations. These workers are
usually involved in medium-high skill occupations, with a non-negligible share of graduates and
post-graduates. The wage elasticity estimated by FULL OLS is, in this case, even higher, coming
to 7.7%.
For all groups, when taking into account real wages, we observe a sharp drop in the estimated
wage elasticity, which comes close to zero and is not statistically significant (with only one ex-
ception for external staff of private firms, in which case it is negative and statistically significant).
When including worker fixed effects, for all categories, we confirm that workers’ sorting plays a
considerable role for each subgroup of independent contractors.
For final verification, in Table 10, we investigate whether controlling for unemployment rate
could affect the size and statistical significance of the estimated UWP, as predicted by Boeri et al.
(2017). What emerges, again, also for independent contractors, is that introducing the unemploy-
ment rate as additional explanatory variable does not change the baseline estimates. This suggests
that the unemployment rates are not correlated with population density within provinces.
Table 10 about here.
All in all, the evidence reported so far suggests that, in FULL OLS, there are substantial dif-
ferences in results between employees and independent contractors. Since there are no compelling
reasons to believe that the two types of workers differ as regards the quality of amenities that in-
dividuals enjoy and their preferences for locations, the difference in results can be associated with
the different bargaining system regulating the corresponding labour market.22
Nonetheless, amenities, quality of public goods, and idiosyncratic preferences for locations
could still play a part in explaining the absolute levels of the estimated UWP in each group. For
instance, the fact that, for employees, the UWP comes to −5.1% in terms of real wages would
mean that, in equilibrium, the quality of the environment where individuals work has to offset the
real wage penalty suffered by those workers in urban areas. Hence, in cities there will be an over-
representation of employees with strong preferences for these compensating factors. By contrast, as
regards independent contractors for whom we have obtained a positive estimated UWP in nominal
22It might be argued that even earnings of independent contractors could be at least partially anchored to wage
floors for employees involved in the national collective bargaining of the corresponding industry category. Yet, under
the plausible assumption that this effect is invariant across the agglomeration dimension, this issue is unlikely to affect
our conclusions (and even if this was not the case, the differences in UWP between employees and self-employed
should be considered as a lower bound of the collective bargaining effect).
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terms and a zero premium in real terms, preferences for amenities and public goods are assumed to
play a weaker role in choosing where to work.
8 Additional control groups: standard self-employed workers
Our choice of independent contractors as preferred comparison group to identify the role of collec-
tive bargaining in the estimation of the UWP is motivated by the fact that these workers are always
associated with a firm like employees in this respect. Yet one might argue that the self-selection
into the two groups (employees and independent contractors) is responsible for our findings, under
the assumption that self-selection is heterogeneous across the spatial dimension. While there is no
compelling reason why this should be systematically the case, in this section we consider additional
groups of standard self-employed, who are not necessarily associated with a firm.
In particular, we consider the universe of self-employed belonging to professional associations
(ordini professionali). In Italy, for legal qualification to work in these occupations the worker needs
to pass a national examination to enter the association. In turn, the professional associations have
to handle the worker social security contributions directly, through specific pension funds (Casse
degli ordini professionali), which are available in INPS, even if they are formally separated from
the INPS archives covering employees and independent contractors.23
These self-employed workers may be either high-skilled or medium-skilled. We take high-
skilled self-employed workers to be those employed in occupations that require a tertiary univer-
sity degree, such as business consultants, lawyers, architects, and physicians/dentists. Among the
medium-skilled self-employed, we include those with upper secondary education, such as journal-
ists, surveyors, and accountants.24
The data on standard self-employed workers include: individual yearly wages, period worked
(more than 90% of workers work for the full year), occupation, gender, age, and municipality where
the worker lives (time-invariant). The latter information differs from that available for employees
and self-employed workers, for whom we can make use of the time-varying information on where
the job is located. This is expected to make no great difference since by carrying out the analysis at
the LLM level we maximize the probability that individuals work and live in the same spatial unit
of observation. Moreover, for standard self-employed, the variable indicating the place of residence
23Our data do not include workers that do not belong to ordini professionali. For this reason, we have no information
on standard unskilled self-employed workers, such as plumbers.
24These categories are the most representative: they cover almost 90% of observations in the INPS archives of
standard self-employed. The full list is: psychologists, nurses, industrial engineers, farmers, biologists, journalists,
architects, lawyers, physicians/dentists, veterinaries, surveyors, accountants, business consultants, and multi-category
(agronomists, foresters, actuaries, chemists, and geologists).
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is time-constant, and this prevents us from implementing fixed effect estimation. Nonetheless, it
is worth noting that we could expect spatial mobility for standard self-employed workers to be
low, since their occupations are based on client networks at the local level, and changing locations
would mean losing this asset. Occupations such as those of lawyers, architects, and surveyors are
clear examples of such mechanisms: leaving a local market means losing the business network.
The econometric specification employed in our analysis for standard self-employed workers
is chosen as close as possible to that already used for employees and independent contractors.
A number of variables cannot, however, be defined for standard self-employed workers, such as
industry dummies and firm size, since there is no firm associated, and the dummies for part time
and/or temporary contracts, since these variables make little sense for a standard self-employed
worker and are not recorded by INPS. We again focus on male workers aged 18-64, who work the
full year. As before, our main covariate of interest is population density. The main control variables
are: age dummies, province dummies, and year fixed effects. After dropping outliers (1% at the
top and bottom of the distribution of yearly income), we end up with a sample of around 4,150,000
observations for the period 2005-2015.
Table 11 shows the results when the whole group of standard self-employed workers is consid-
ered. As for nominal wages, OLS estimation that only includes year fixed effects gives an estimated
UWP amounting to 11.4% (reported in column (1)), which is much greater than the corresponding
figure found for employees (equal to 4.6%). After including all control variables in the regression
and occupation dummies (FULL OLS), the wage elasticity becomes 5.3% (see column (2)), which
is very close to that estimated for the independent contractors (4.8%, see column (1) of Table 8).
Moving on to real wages, the wage elasticity obtained with only year fixed effects is still sizable,
5.8%, and statistically significant (column (3)), while after including all control dummies the UWP
comes very close to zero and is no longer statistically significant (column (4)). Again, it is worth
noting that these findings are similar to those obtained for the group of independent contractors.
Table 11 about here.
Table 12 shows the results for specific subgroups (which, aggregated, account for almost 90%
of the population of standard self-employed workers). In the first four columns, the high-skilled
occupations (consultants, lawyers, physicians, architects) are considered, while the medium-skilled
occupations (journalists, surveyors, accountants) are presented in the last three columns. Observ-
ing the nominal wages (top panel), we see that the estimated wage elasticity to population density
is very large for some high-skilled subgroups: it comes to 12.1% for lawyers and 9.9% for con-
sultants, including all control variables. For these subgroups, a potential worry is that the very
large estimated UWP is due to sorting of workers in the space dimension. For instance, one might
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expect that an individual aiming to excel in the legal profession would have to move to a big city,
where the most important trials take place. Unfortunately, we are unable to identify such an effect
with any precision since we cannot run fixed-effects estimates due to the worker location being
time-invariant, as already pointed out. Nonetheless, even for the medium-skilled occupations, the
estimated UWP are sizable and statistically different from zero: 6.5% for journalists, 3.3% for
surveyors, and 4.7% for accountants. For these occupations, and in particular for surveyors and
accountants, self-selection of workers with respect to ability and other unobservable characteristics
is expected to be less important, suggesting that their positive and large estimated UWP cannot be
entirely due to worker sorting and unobserved heterogeneity.
Moving on to real wages (bottom panel), we still find a sizable estimated UWP for Consultants
(5.0%) and Lawyers (7.0%), including all control variables, while a penalty, even if fairly small
(between −1% and −2%), is found for physicians, architects, and surveyors. For the remaining
subgroups, estimated UWP are not statistically different from zero.
Overall, the analysis on additional subgroups of self-employed confirms that, when no institu-
tional constraints are at work for wage setting, the estimated UWP is positive and non-negligible
in nominal terms, and for some subgroups the UWP are positive even in real terms. Furthermore,
UWP differences between employees and all the different groups of self-employed workers can
hardly be entirely due to self-selection, since the average ability of the various subgroups of stan-
dard self-employed workers differ remarkably in average ability (as we have seen, for instance,
between medium- and high-skilled occupations).
Table 12 about here.
9 Beyond the mean: unconditional quantile regressions
So far our analysis has been carried out at the conditional mean, adopting standard estimation
methods. In this section, we estimate the UWP at different points of the wage distribution, the
10th, the 50th, and the 90th percentiles, to capture possible heterogeneity in wage elasticities across
groups of workers. The aim is to explore how incentives in location choices and worker self-
selection may vary across groups of individuals depending on their earnings, which represent a
proxy of their skill levels. This is also relevant considering that, in the Italian two-tier multi-
employer bargaining system, high-productive firms in cities can actually pay higher wages to the
worker: the in melius clause does not prevent firms from raising wages as much as they want at the
local level, for instance using performance-pay schemes, while imposing downward wage rigidity.
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On the one hand, we aim at investigating whether high-wage employees (at the 90th percentile)
earn higher returns in cities than the equivalent non-urban employees, even in the presence of
collective bargaining. One might expect skilled workers to be able to extract higher wages in de-
centralized and individual bargaining (on top of that resulting from industry collective bargaining),
and that this could be more likely in agglomerated areas where firms are more productive. In this
case, differences in UWP between employees and self-employed workers detected at the condi-
tional mean could shrink. On the other hand, one might expect local collective agreements in cities
to benefit most at the bottom tail of the wage distribution, for instance in the case where local bar-
gaining is undertaken by local unions mostly interested in the welfare of unskilled workers. Matano
and Naticchioni (2017), considering Italian blue-collar workers, show that the extent of rent sharing
decreases along the wage distribution, mainly due to the role of the unions.
In order to investigate these issues, we make use of the unconditional quantile regressions
(UQR) technique, proposed by Firpo and Lemieux (2009).25 For closer comparison of the dif-
ferences across groups, we present the results by plotting the point estimates as well as the corre-
sponding 95% confidence interval, as done in Figures 7, 8 and 9. In this exercise, we adopt the same
baseline specifications adopted for the regressions recorded in the previous sections, including all
control variables.
The top panels of Figure 7 show the FULL OLS estimates using UQR for each group of work-
ers (employees, independent contractors, standard self-employed workers) corresponding to the
10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution. The left panel refers to nominal wages.
As regards employees, the estimated wage elasticities are rather low, close to zero, and slightly
increasing along the wage distribution (consistently with Matano and Naticchioni, 2012): from
−0.6% at the 10th percentile to 0.7% at the 90th percentile. This suggests that unskilled employ-
ees (10th percentile) are penalized even when considering nominal wages. As regards independent
contractors and standard self-employed workers, estimated wage elasticities are very high for all
percentiles, with a U-shape impact. In particular, for independent contractors, the estimated UWP
ranges from 5.2% at the 10th percentile to 3.9% at the median, to 7.4% at the 90th percentile;
for standard self-employed, on the other hand, the estimated UWP is fairly stable along the wage
distribution, at around 5-6%.
25The underlying idea here is to estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable is replaced by the recen-
tered influence function (RIF) of the distributional parameter. This methodology enables us to estimate the impact of
population density on quantiles of the unconditional distribution of wages, employing the same specification chosen
for the conditional mean analysis. It is worth stressing the importance of using UQR instead of the standard condi-
tional quantile regressions (Koenker, 1982): when using conditional quantile regressions, for instance at the median,
the estimates refer to the median of the “error term”, whereas by using unconditional median quantile regressions it is
possible to detect the impact of the covariates on the median of the unconditional distribution, which is what we are
interested in.
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Figure 7 about here.
This evidence suggests that differences across worker groups prove even greater when we take
into account the 90th percentile of the wage distribution than when we consider its mean. In
particular, the difference in estimated UWP between employees and independent contractors rises
from 5% at the mean to around 7% at the 90th percentile: high-skilled employees are unable to
obtain higher returns in cities or reach the level of the self-employed workers. The differences
at the 10th percentiles are also comparable to those derived at the mean: the difference between
employees and independent contractors is around 5%, while that between employees and self-
employed workers is even greater, around 6%.
The results for real wages are shown in the right panels of Figure 7. Estimates for employees
prove negative and substantial, ranging from−6% at the 10th percentile to around−4% at the 90th
percentile. By contrast, in the case of independent contractors and standard self-employed workers,
the high-wage individuals (the 90th percentile) obtain higher earnings than the corresponding non-
urban workers: they are able to extract a positive and non-negligible wage premium, of around
2%. Hence, also in the case of real wages, employees do not close the gap with self-employed
workers, the differences in estimated UWP being of about 5% at the mean and about 6% at the 90th
percentile. A similar argument applies to unskilled workers at the 10th percentile.
The bottom panels of Figure 7 illustrate the results from FE estimation to take into account
worker sorting, respectively for employees and independent contractors.26 We find that, for the for-
mer group, nominal UWP (bottom-left panel) from UQR are fairly similar to those detected using
FULL OLS estimates (top-left), confirming our conclusions from the analysis on the conditional
mean. As for independent contractors, on the other hand, the corresponding estimates are smaller
but still positive (estimated UWP equal to 2.2% at the 90th percentile and 1% at the median, while
not being statistically different from zero at the 10th percentile) than those obtained in FULL OLS,
suggesting, once again, that worker sorting is playing a non-negligible role here. In terms of real
wages (bottom-right panel), the estimated UWP, which do not change much with respect to the
FULL OLS estimates (top-right) for employees, drop substantially for independent contractors,
confirming the role of sorting. Similar evidence can be observed for unskilled workers at the 10th
percentile.
Finally, Figures 8 and 9 plot the UQR estimates obtained separately for the main subgroups of,
respectively, independent contractors and standard self-employed workers.
As for independent contractors (Figure 8), the estimates are consistent with those regarding the
overall group with a slightly increasing trend for estimated UWP of auditors/company administra-
26As already pointed out, we cannot carry out fixed effect regressions for standard self-employed workers.
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tors and external staff of PA and a more steeply increasing trend for external staff of private firms.
For the latter, the nominal (real) estimated OLS elasticity ranges from −7% (−15%) at the 10th
percentile to a very high 17% (12%) at the 90th percentile, as shown in the left (right) panel.
Figure 8 about here.
As for standard self-employed workers (Figure 9), for all groups (with the sole exception of
accountants) the trend of nominal UWP along the wage distribution (left panel) is clearly increas-
ing, with some remarkable peaks for some groups of skilled workers, such as lawyers (estimated
UWP amounting to 18% at the 90th percentile). It is worth noting that also for medium-skilled oc-
cupations (journalists, accountants, and surveyors) the premia are still highly positive and sizable,
ranging from 3% to 7%. Turning to real wages (right panel), we find a general drop in estimates,
consistently with previous results, but we still observe increasing trends along the wage distribution
for the various categories and very high estimated UWP even in real terms: 15% for lawyers at the
90th percentile, 7% for business accountant.
Figure 9 about here.
Our evidence shows that UWP differences between employees and self-employed workers do
not change much along the wage distribution. For high-skilled workers, this means that performance-
pay schemes do not play a distinct role in mitigating their real penalties in cities. As already pointed
out, there is no limitation for productive firms in cities to pay higher wages to their workers on a
performance-pay base. So why is this so? On the one hand, it could be argued that two-tier sys-
tems are associated with higher overall labour costs, and this might limit the scope for the firms to
introduce performance-pay schemes (Boeri, 2015). On the other hand, it could be argued that the
two-tier collective bargaining might be considered a social norm, representing a reference bench-
mark for all firms, even those that are more productive and could pay higher wages. Since second-
level bargaining is not compulsory, firms are not used to bargaining at the local level, as in other
countries, and they cannot be blamed for not using the decentralized tier. This is confirmed by the
low incidence of local collective agreements in Italy. Interestingly, UWP are not detected even for
unskilled workers, at the 10th percentile. As stressed, this might have been the case if the unions
had been interested in resorting to local agreements to raise wages mainly for unskilled workers in
cities, where their purchasing power is limited by the higher cost of living.
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10 Robustness checks
In this section, we implement an array of robustness checks to verify whether our conclusions are
affected by our choices in the empirical strategy implemented so far. For the sake of simplicity, we
focus on two main groups of workers: employees and independent contractors.27
To begin with, instead of considering the workforce aged 15-64, Table 13 provides OLS and FE
estimates on the full model, which includes both individual and worker characteristics, focusing on
prime age male workers only (aged 25-49), often used as a reference group in the urban economics
literature. The results are in line with those set out in Tables 3, 5, and 7.
Table 13 about here.
In Table 14, we investigate whether our results are affected by the choice of the earnings mea-
sure and use yearly wages instead of weekly/daily wages: again we find that the previous results
remain substantially unaltered.
Table 14 about here.
We further check whether our results hold when using more disaggregated spatial units of ob-
servation, going from 611 LLMs to more than 8,000 municipalities.28 The results are shown in
Table 15 where we observe, for employees, a substantial real wage penalty that comes very close
to zero for independent contractors. Both estimates are negative and considerable in size when we
also include worker fixed effects in estimation. Thus, the conclusions drawn employing LLMs are
largely corroborated.
Table 15 about here.
In Tables 16 and 17, we check the robustness of our previous findings to alternative agglomer-
ation measures. First, we use employment density: as shown in Table 16, our results are very close
to those obtained when employing population density.
Table 16 about here.
27The results for standard self-employed workers are consistent with those reported in the main analysis and are
available from the authors upon request.
28The number of individual observations can shrink in this exercise, because the number of missing data points for
prices at the municipality level is slightly larger than for those at the LLM level.
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Second, we adopt a dummy variable approach to identify urban areas, consisting in making use
of the EU-OECD definition of “functional urban areas” (see OECD, 2012) and following the related
three-step methodology to identify 73 urban areas among the 611 LLMs (Lamorgese and Petrella,
2016, see OECD, 2016, for the list).29 We then rerun our regressions employing as agglomeration
measure a dummy variable of one if the LLM is an urban area and zero otherwise. Interestingly,
the results provided in Table 17 are similar to those previously reported, although coefficients of
interest are now associated to dummy variables and as such should be interpreted.
Table 17 about here.
In order to check whether our results depend on our measure of local CPI, we try two alternative
approaches to compute it. With the former, we implement Moretti’s methodology (as described in
Subsection 3.2), without removing housing compositional effects. The results are displayed in
Table 18 and are consistent with previous conclusions.
Table 18 about here.
The second measure of CPI relies on the official absolute poverty thresholds issued by Istat
(2017). These thresholds are computed by macro-region (North, Center, South) and municipality
size (less than 50 thousands inhabitants, between 50 and 250 thousand, and more than 250 thou-
sand).30 The descriptive statistics for 2015 are shown in Table 19. In all the macro-regions, the
poverty thresholds in municipalities with a population greater than 250 thousand are at least 10%
higher than those in small municipalities. Of course, the basket of goods included in the computa-
tion of the absolute poverty thresholds may differ from a standard basket used to compute a CPI,
although the two baskets are closely correlated.
Table 19 about here.
29The first step selects “agglomerated areas” as clusters of dense neighboring cells (at least 1,500 inhabitants per
square km) of at least 50,000 inhabitants and “urban centers” as the aggregation of municipalities where at least
half of the population resides in the urban center. In the second step, the “metropolitan cores” are identified among
the previously selected “agglomerated areas” as those that meet the following three conditions: the agglomerated
municipalities are linked by administrative channels; at least half of the population of the area lives in one of the urban
centers; at least 75% of the population of the urban centers belonging to the area lives in the urban agglomeration. The
third step defines “urban areas” as the aggregation of the metropolitan core and its commuting neighborhood. Those
LLMs that contain a metropolitan core are defined “urban areas”.
30Note that Istat also provides different thresholds for different sizes of households. Since the INPS archives do not
include information on household size, we consider all workers in our dataset as one-person households. The results
do not change when considering households of different sizes and are available upon request.
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We make use of this information to assign to each municipality a cost of living given by the
associated absolute poverty thresholds, matching the macro-region and the municipality size. We
then compute an index (we call it Istat CPI) dividing the threshold by the mean of the Italian average
threshold in the base year (2005). Using Istat CPI, we deflate nominal wages to derive our real wage
measure. The estimation results, shown in Table 20, are consistent with our conclusions from the
baseline analysis.
Table 20 about here.
We further explore whether our results are affected by the period considered. This might be
an issue since housing prices increased in Italy until 2010 and decreased afterwards: our findings
could be driven by dynamics at work in just one of these two time spans and, as a consequence,
may not be generalized. Table 21 shows, respectively for employees (top panel) and independent
contractors (bottom panel), the estimated UWP for two alternative time intervals: 2005-2010 and
2011-2015. As will be seen, the findings are consistent across periods.
Table 21 about here.
The last robustness check consists in controlling for a much finer spatial unobserved hetero-
geneity, with fixed effects at the LLM (rather than province) level. Since introduction of this set of
fixed effects is somewhat demanding in our empirical specification, we implement an alternative
(still well-established) two-stage approach developed by Combes et al. (2008). The first stage con-
sists in estimating the coefficients on the interaction between LLM and year fixed effects in a wage
equation at the individual level with worker and firm level controls adopted in OLS estimation.31
These estimated coefficients are then regressed in the second stage on the (log) population density,
adding only yearly time dummies to control for business cycle effects. The coefficient of popula-
tion density can be compared to the one developed with our preferred methodology. The estimation
results from the second stage are set out in Table 22 and amply confirm our previous conclusions.
Hence we can state that the results reported in Sections 6 and 7 are not affected by the introduction
of the finest possible set of dummies at the LLM level.
Table 22 about here.
31The first-stage equation regression is:
log(Wilt) = βlt +η1Xilt +η2Z jlt +δt + εilt
where, as before, log(Wilt) is the logarithm of the real or nominal wage of individual i working in LLM l at time t;
βlt are LLM-year fixed effects; Xilt is the vector of individual controls including dummies for being on a part-time
contract, being on a fixed-term contract, occupation, and age; Z jlt is the vector of firm level controls including (log)
firm size and dummies for NCLAs; δt are the year fixed effects.
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11 Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this paper, we present thorough investigation into estimation of the UWP in Italy, a country
characterized by a two-tier collective bargaining system and a heterogeneous local cost of living,
for different categories of workers: employees, self-employed workers, and subgroups of them. We
make use of unique administrative archives from INPS and a housing transactions database from
Italian Revenue Agency (2015) for the period 2005-2015.
Our results, controlling for all worker and firm characteristics, reveal that, when employees are
taken into account, the elasticity of nominal wages with respect to urban agglomeration size is very
close to zero, while the corresponding elasticity of real wages is −5.1%. This result does not hold
for self-employed workers (either independent contractors or standard self-employed), for whom
we obtain a corresponding estimate of about 5% for nominal wages and an estimated elasticity that
is non-statistically different from zero for real wages.
These findings, which are robust to a wide range of robustness checks, suggest a role is played
by the collective bargaining system in the presence of high spatial heterogeneity in the cost of living,
given that employees and self-employed workers tend to share local amenities and public goods.
Indeed, since we consider various subsamples of self-employed workers, both skilled and unskilled,
the difference in estimated UWP found for the two groups can hardly be put down to self-selection.
Our results apply with similar magnitude also along the wage distribution, using unconditional
quantile regressions, suggesting that decentralized collective bargaining is not playing a major role
in Italy - neither for unskilled nor skilled workers.
While the evidence presented in the paper seems to be relevant per se, our findings contribute to
a lively and topical policy debate, which concerns Italy as well as many other European countries.
We can organize the major issues raised by debate in Italy in two groups.
We will begin with issues related to the proper functioning of centralized bargaining (see, for
a review, D’Amuri and Nizzi, 2017). First, in recent years numerous national labor contracts have
been signed by “minor” employers’ and workers’ associations that tend to set levels of wages below
the wage floors specified in the “major” national agreements of the same job-sectoral categories
(D’Amuri and Nizzi, 2017). Second, non-compliance by many firms has also implied that many
workers are paid less than the sectoral minimum wage set by the national agreement (according
to Garnero, 2018, on average, around 10% of the workers are paid 20% less than the minimum
wage).32 Third, a conspicuous share of the contracts (at present about half of the total) have expired
32A related issue lies in the actual non-application of Article 39 of the Italian Constitution, according to which
workers’ and employers’ associations with legal personality should be able to stipulate agreements with compulsory
effectiveness for all relevant categories, establishing a “decent” level of pay for workers (Article 36 of the Italian
Constitution). Application of this principle is impeded by the fact that in Italy the trade unions remain, at present,
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but are still in force. The delay in renewal of the national contracts impedes or retards “national”
wage adjustments over time.
More relevant to the focus of the present paper, there are issues concerning the infrequent use
of the second level of bargaining. Formally, there is no institutional constraint that stops firms from
raising wages if located in cities with a high cost of living. Actually, there is some anecdotical
evidence that the second level of bargaining is more at work in the high productivity areas, such as
the North of Italy and the cities. But this has proven insufficient to offset the higher cost of living.
This is an issue that needs a deeper investigation. Apart from cases where firms are constrained by
higher labour costs due to a two-tier system, a speculative explanation might also consider the case
where collective bargaining becomes a social norm, in the sense that in countries where collective
bargaining is particularly widespread and well-established, it represents a reference benchmark for
all firms, even those that are more productive and that could pay higher wages.
To align wages and productivity performance better, some authors have also proposed relaxing
the in melius clause associated with the second level of bargaining (see, again, D’Amuri and Nizzi,
2017) and making this possibility dependent on the approval of the local labour unions. Other
proposals refer to a possible overall change in the current system, such as replacement of the na-
tional bargaining structure with the adoption of a system based on decentralization at the firm level.
Implementation of such decentralization, however, is likely to raise serious applicability issues, es-
pecially in the phase of transition to a new equilibrium. In the case of Italy, the situation is further
complicated by the specificities of the productive system, where 90% of the firms have less than 15
employees, and only less than 5% of the firms with less than 15 employees have trade unions at the
local level (Devicienti et al. 2018). This is relevant because in small and/or non-unionized firms, the
workers’ bargaining power could be much lower than that of the employers, and this could be par-
ticularly true of areas characterized by high unemployment rates. The introduction of a minimum
wages imposed by the government rather than by the collective bargaining has also been suggested
by some scholars (for a discussion, see Boeri, 2009, and Garnero et al., 2015). Finally, some other
authors (e.g., Garnero, 2018) propose actions that would improve the functioning of the current
system, without significantly altering its institutional setting, such as rationalizing the number of
collective contracts, acknowledging only agreements signed by the major unions and employers
associations, and improving transparency and information disclosure on negotiated wages.
The evidence presented in our work casts light on a specific, but highly significant aspect of this
thorny question, concerning workers’ remuneration in real terms in the presence of high variability
without legal personality. As a matter of fact, however, in cases of controversy, the judge has so far often taken as
reference point for the “decent” level of pay the national contracts stipulated by the most representative unions and
employers associations.
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in the costs of living across areas. Additional research effort and policy debate are required to shed
further light on the functioning of the collective bargaining system and on its interaction with the
features of the Italian productive system and labour markets.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Local CPI and population density in 2005, by LLM
Figure 2: Distribution of local CPI in 2005, by LLM
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Figure 3: Distribution of population and employment density in 2005, by LLM
Figure 4: Distribution of nominal and real wages in 2005, by LLM
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Figure 5: Unemployment rate and population density in 2005, by LLM
Figure 6: Employment rate and population density in 2005, by LLM
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Figure 7: Unconditional quantile regressions: all workers
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Figure 8: Unconditional quantile regressions: Independent contractors
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Figure 9: Unconditional quantile regressions: Standard self-employed
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Table 1: Within-between variance decomposition of
nominal and real weekly wages in 2005
Nominal Wages
Macro-Regions Regions Provinces
Between 4.4 4.7 6.2
Within 95.6 95.3 93.8
Total 100 100 100
Real Wages
Macro-Regions Regions Provinces
Between 3.5 4.3 5.8
Within 96.5 95.7 94.2
Total 100 100 100
Note: 5 Macro-regions; 103 provinces; 20 regions.
Evidence computed on the universe of employees.
Table 2: Nominal versus real weekly wages in 2005
Population density Nominal wages Real wages
first 20 % 401 446
20-40 % 428 459
40-60 % 444 458
60-80 % 472 465
top 20 % 511 443
total 452 452
Note: Quantiles weighted by population.
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Table 3: UWP estimates. Employees: baseline specification
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS + worker charact. FULL OLS OLS + worker charact. FULL OLS
log population density 0.046*** 0.006*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.041*** -0.051***
(0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.012) (0.004)
part time -0.154*** -0.072*** -0.185*** -0.070***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
fixed term -0.103*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.124***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
log firm size 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002)
age dummies no yes yes no yes yes
occupation dummies no yes yes no yes yes
contract dummies no no yes no no yes
area dummies no yes yes no yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891
R-squared 0.041 0.515 0.608 0.005 0.444 0.591
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is weekly nominal wage; in columns (4)-(6) it is weekly real wage. Occupation
dummies stands for, namely, white collar, blue collar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dummies are dummies for
NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: UWP estimates. Employees by occupation categories
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
Blue collars
log population density -0.000 -0.002** -0.052*** -0.056***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 49,559,314 49,247,306 49,559,314 49,247,306
R-squared 0.358 0.801 0.378 0.807
White collars
log population density 0.014*** 0.005*** -0.045*** -0.055***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 20,193,761 19,952,336 20,193,761 19,952,336
R-squared 0.395 0.894 0.402 0.893
Managers and executives
log population density 0.014*** -0.003*** -0.051*** -0.065***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 3,343,657 3,343,657 3,343,657 3,343,657
R-squared 0.279 0.869 0.318 0.872
Controls used in the different columns
control variables yes yes yes yes
age dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is yearly nominal wages; in
columns (3)-(4) it is yearly real wage. Contract dummies are dummies for
NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Standard errors are clustered at
the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: UWP estimates. Employees: fixed effects and IV estimates
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE AKM IV-FE FE AKM IV-FE
log population density -0.000 0.002* 0.000 -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.102***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011
part time 0.046*** 0.065*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.065*** 0.047***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
fixed term -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.050***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003
log firm size 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
worker fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm fe no yes no no yes no
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 76,755,407 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891
R-squared 0.892 0.892 0.9172 0.886 0.885 0.9131
K-P rk Wald F statistic 126.307 126.307
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is weekly nominal wage; in columns (4)-(6) it is weekly
real wage. Occupation dummies stands for, namely, white collar, blue collar, apprentice, manager, and
executive; contract dummies are dummies for NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Standard errors
are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: UWP estimates. Employees: controlling for unemployment rate
Nominal wages Real wages
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
log population density 0.003 0.000 -0.052*** -0.055***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
part time -0.072*** 0.046*** -0.070*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
fixed term -0.119*** -0.048*** -0.124*** -0.049***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
log firm size 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
unemployment rate -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891
R-squared 0.608 0.892 0.591 0.886
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is weekly nominal wages;
in columns (4)-(6) it is weekly real wage. Occupation dummies stands for,
namely, white collar, blue collar, apprentice, manager, and executive; con-
tract dummies are dummies for NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts.
Standard errors are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 7: UWP estimates. Independent contractors: baseline specification
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FULL OLS FE AKM IV-FE FULL OLS FE AKM IV-FE
log population density 0.049*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.009** -0.014 -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.083***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013)
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
firm fe no no yes no no no yes no
Observations 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362
R-squared 0.210 0.785 0.828 0.784 0.216 0.786 0.829 0.786
K-P rk Wald F statistic 298.009 298.009
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is daily nominal wage; in columns (5)-(8) it is daily real wage. Industry
dummies stands for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19 categories of independent
contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: UWP estimates. Independent contractors: controlling for firm size
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FULL OLS FE AKM IV-FE FULL OLS FE AKM IV-FE
log population density 0.048*** 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.013 -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.087***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015)
log firm size 0.066*** 0.038*** 0.054*** 0.038*** 0.065*** 0.037*** 0.054*** 0.037***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
firm fe no no yes no no no yes no
Observations 4,475,419 4,475,419 4,475,419 3,898,533 4,475,419 4,475,419 4,475,419 4,475,419
R-squared 0.218 0.797 0.834 0.796 0.227 0.799 0.836 0.798
K-P rk Wald F statistic 303.140 303.140
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is daily nominal wage; in columns (5)-(8) it is daily real wage. Industry
dummies stands for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19 categories of independent
contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: UWP estimates. Independent contractors by category
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FULL OLS FE AKM IV-FE FULL OLS FE AKM IV-FE
Statutory auditors, company administrators, and legal representatives
log population density 0.060*** 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.080***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014)
Observations 2,729,133 2,729,133 2,729,133 2,729,133 2,729,133 2,729,133 2,729,133 2,729,133
R-squared 0.159 0.781 0.815 0.779 0.158 0.781 0.815 0.778
External staff of private firms
log population density 0.031*** 0.006 0.003 0.009 -0.038*** -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.087***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 2,410,877 2,410,877 2,410,877 2,410,877 2,410,877 2,410,877 2,410,877 2,410,877
R-squared 0.164 0.797 0.840 0.797 0.166 0.798 0.841 0.798
External staff of public administration
log population density 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.135** 0.069* 0.012 -0.000 0.039 -0.039
(0.028) (0.025) (0.055) (0.037) (0.033) (0.030) (0.058) (0.035)
Observations 188,328 188,328 188,328 188,328 188,328 188,328 188,328 188,328
R-squared 0.139 0.773 0.786 0.775 0.134 0.771 0.785 0.774
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
firm fe no no yes no no no yes no
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is daily nominal wages; in columns (5)-(8) it is daily real wages. Industry
dummies stands for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: UWP estimates. Independent contractors: controlling for unemploy-
ment rate
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
log population density 0.050*** 0.010*** -0.013 -0.055***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.012) (0.009)
unemployment rate -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362
R-squared 0.210 0.785 0.216 0.786
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is daily nominal wages;
in columns (4)-(6) it is daily real wages. Industry dummies stands for 86
2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19
categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the
LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: UWP estimates. Standard self-employed
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FULL OLS OLS FULL OLS
log population density 0.114*** 0.053*** 0.058* 0.002
(0.040) (0.004) (-0.034) (0.005)
age dummies no yes no yes
area dummies no yes no yes
self-empl. w. dummies no yes no yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,154,141 4,154,140 4,154,141 4,154,140
R-squared 0.014 0.267 0.005 0.253
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is yearly nominal wages;
in columns (3)-(4) it is yearly real wages. Self-employed workers dummies
for 14 categories of standard self-employed workers. Standard errors are
clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: UWP estimates. Standard self-employed: high-skilled versus medium-skilled workers
High skilled/Graduates Medium skilled/Non graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Consultants Lawyers Physicians Architects Journalists Surveyors Accountants
Nominal wages
log population density 0.099*** 0.121*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.065*** 0.033*** 0.047***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 329,709 813,197 839,317 838,825 102,666 598,215 158,975
R-squared 0.303 0.186 0.080 0.129 0.073 0.204 0.250
Real wages
log population density 0.050*** 0.070*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 0.013 -0.015** -0.004
(0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 329,709 813,197 839,317 838,825 102,666 598,215 158,975
R-squared 0.283 0.167 0.121 0.079 0.060 0.187 0.227
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The dependent variable is yearly (either nominal or real) wages. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Robustness checks: Prime age workers only (25-49)
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
Employees
log population density 0.002 -0.000 -0.053*** -0.057***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
part time -0.080*** 0.043*** -0.078*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
fixed term -0.126*** -0.050*** -0.131*** -0.051***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
log firm size 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 56,696,640 56,696,640 56,696,640 56,696,640
R-squared 0.575 0.888 0.560 0.883
Independent contractors
log population density 0.068*** 0.016*** -0.001 -0.053***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 3,837,258 3,837,258 3,837,258 3,837,258
R-squared 0.187 0.774 0.196 0.776
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly/daily nominal
wages respectively for employees and independent contractors; in columns
(3)-(4) it is weekly/daily real wages. Occupation dummies stands for, namely,
white collar, blue collar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dum-
mies are dummies for NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry
dummies stands for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies
are dummies for 19 categories of independent contractors. Standard errors
are clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14: Robustness checks: Yearly wages
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
Employees
log population density 0.003 0.005 -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
part time -0.579*** -0.355*** -0.577*** -0.355***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
fixed term -0.507*** -0.302*** -0.513*** -0.303***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
log firm size 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 77,015,879 77,015,879 77,015,879 77,015,879
R-squared 0.564 0.800 0.557 0.797
Independent contractors
log population density 0.021** 0.001 -0.042*** -0.065***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362 5,825,362
R-squared 0.311 0.836 0.326 0.84
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is yearly nominal wages re-
spectively for employees and independent contractors; in columns (3)-(4) it
is yearly real wages. Occupation dummies stands for, namely, white collar,
blue collar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dummies are dum-
mies for NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry dummies stands
for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for
19 categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the
LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 15: Robustness checks: Municipalities rather than LLM (Real wages)
Employees Independent contractors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
log population density -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.003 -0.064***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
part time -0.068*** 0.047*** no no
(0.006) (0.003)
fixed term -0.131*** -0.051*** no no
(0.004) (0.003)
log firm size 0.022*** 0.016*** no no
(0.001) (0.001)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes no no
industry dummies no no yes yes
contractors dummies no no yes yes
area dummies yes yes no no
area dummies no no yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 76,998,804 76,998,804 5,824,543 5,824,543
R-squared 0.582 0.884 0.222 0.788
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly real wages for
employees; in columns (3)-(4) it is daily real wage for independent con-
tractors. Occupation dummies stands for, namely, white collar, blue col-
lar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dummies are dummies for
NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry dummies stands for 86
2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19
categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the
LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 16: Robustness checks: Employment density rather than population density
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
Employees
log employment density 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.042*** -0.045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
part time 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
fixed term -0.072*** 0.046*** -0.070*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
log firm size -0.119*** -0.048*** -0.124*** -0.049***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891
R-squared 0.608 0.892 0.591 0.886
Independent contractors
log employment density 0.042*** 0.012*** -0.005 -0.040***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 5,348,595 5,348,595 5,348,595 5,348,595
R-squared 0.210 0.788 0.217 0.790
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly/daily nominal
wages respectively for employees and independent contractors; in columns (3)-
(4) it is weekly/daily real wages. Occupation dummies stands for, namely,
white collar, blue collar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dummies
are dummies for NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry dummies
stands for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dum-
mies for 19 categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered
at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 17: Robustness checks: Urban dummy computed as in Lamorgese and
Petrella (2016)
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
Employees
urban LLM 0.001 -0.001 -0.066*** -0.072***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005)
part time -0.072*** 0.046*** -0.070*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
fixed term -0.119*** -0.048*** -0.125*** -0.049***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
log firm size 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891 77,015,891
R-squared 0.6084 0.8917 0.5903 0.8859
Independent contractors
urban LLM 0.102*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.091***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 5,825,374 5,825,374 5,825,374 5,825,374
R-squared 0.206 0.785 0.214 0.786
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly/daily nominal
wages respectively for employees and independent contractors; in columns
(3)-(4) it is weekly/daily real wages. Urban LLM is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the LLM is located in an urban area and to zero otherwise.
Occupation dummies stands for, namely, white collar, blue collar, appren-
tice, manager, and executive; contract dummies are dummies for NCLAs,
which cover about 243 contracts. Industry dummies stands for 86 2-digit
Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19 cate-
gories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 18: Robustness checks: Housing pricing without removing compositional
effects
Employees Independent contractors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
log population density -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.020* -0.063***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008)
part time -0.070*** 0.046*** no no
(0.006) (0.003)
fixed term -0.125*** -0.049*** no no
(0.004) (0.003)
log firm size 0.022*** 0.016*** no no
(0.002) (0.001)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes no no
contract dummies yes yes no no
industry dummies no no yes yes
contractors dummies no no yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 5,825,362 5,825,362
R-squared 0.589 0.885 0.214 0.786
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly real wages for
employees; in columns (3)-(4) it is daily real wage for independent con-
tractors. Occupation dummies stands for, namely, white collar, blue col-
lar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dummies are dummies for
NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry dummies stands for 86
2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19
categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the
LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 19: Absolute poverty thresholds (Istat) by macro-regions and municipality size (year 2015)
North Centre South and Islands North Centre South and Islands
Up to 50 thousands 734.74 699.49 552.39 1.00 1.00 1.00
From 50 to 250 thousands 779.97 746.44 588.52 1.06 1.07 1.07
Above 250 thousands 819.13 787.1 609.28 1.11 1.13 1.10
Note: The threshold refers to families with one member only.
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Table 20: Robustness checks: Alternative local CPI computed using poverty
thresholds
Employees Independent contractors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
log population density -0.026*** -0.028*** 0.015* -0.028***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
part time -0.073*** 0.046*** no no
(0.006) (0.003)
fixed term -0.119*** -0.047*** no no
(0.004) (0.003)
log firm size 0.022*** 0.016*** no no
(0.002) (0.001)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes no no
contract dummies yes yes no no
industry dummies no no yes yes
contractors dummies no no yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
worker fe no yes no yes
Observations 77,015,891 77,015,891 5,348,595 5,348,595
R-squared 0.572 0.882 0.199 0.785
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly real wages for
employees; in columns (3)-(4) it is daily real wage for independent con-
tractors. Occupation dummies stands for, namely, white collar, blue col-
lar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dummies are dummies for
NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry dummies stands for 86
2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies are dummies for 19
categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are clustered at the
LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 21: Robustness checks: Different time periods
Nominal wages Real wages
2005-2010 2011-2015 2005-2010 2011-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FULL OLS FULL OLS FULL OLS
Employees
log population density 0.003 -0.001 -0.054*** -0.049***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
part time -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.066***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
fixed term -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.128***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log firm size 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
contract dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
Observations 42,881,163 34,134,728 42,881,163 34,134,728
R-squared 0.614 0.590 0.599 0.584
Independent contractors
log population density 0.051*** 0.048*** -0.015 -0.011
(0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
age dummies yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
contractors dummies yes yes yes yes
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,469,655 2,355,707 3,469,655 2,355,707
R-squared 0.194 0.233 0.201 0.242
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is weekly/daily nominal
wages respectively for employees and independent contractors; in columns
(3)-(4) it is weekly/daily real wages. Occupation dummies stands for, namely,
white collar, blue collar, apprentice, manager, and executive; contract dum-
mies are dummies for NCLAs, which cover about 243 contracts. Industry
dummies stands for 86 2-digit Ateco industrial sectors; contractors dummies
are dummies for 19 categories of independent contractors. Standard errors are
clustered at the LLM level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 22: Robustness checks: Two-stage procedure as in Combes et al. (2008)
Nominal wages Real wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FULL OLS FE FULL OLS FE
Employees
log population density -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.026*** -0.027***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
Observations 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558
Independent contractors
log population density 0.060*** -0.012 0.038*** -0.032*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
area dummies yes yes yes yes
year fe yes yes yes yes
Observations 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,399
Note: Estimation results of the second stage of Combes et al. (2008).
Columns (1)-(2) refer to daily nominal wages respectively for employees
and independent contractors; columns (3)-(4) refer to daily real wages. First
stage for employees includes: part time, fixed term, log firm size, age dum-
mies, occupation dummies, contract dummies, LLM× year dummies, year
fixed effects, worker fixed effects (FE only). First stage for independent
contractors includes: age dummies, industry dummies, year fixed effects,
worker fixed effects (FE only). Standard errors are clustered at the LLM
level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix
A Institutional labour market framework and collective bar-
gaining in Italy
Collective bargaining in Italy takes place between labour unions and employer organizations at the
industry level. Apart from detailed working conditions, the collective national agreements settle, for
each job-industry category, wage floors. This system has been introduced in the early 20th century,
with the first company or territorial level collective agreements in manufacturing and agriculture,
while the first nation-wide sectoral agreement goes back to the fifties. In the last decades, the
number of contracts covered by collective bargaining increased over time. They almost cover the
universe of private-sector employees (coverage rate is equal to 96% according to data from the
European Company Survey and to 99% using data from the Structure of Earnings Survey; see
Garnero, 2018).
An industry collective agreement in Italy is erga omnes, i.e. it applies to all workers in that
specific industry. This erga omnes extension is not stated formally in the labour law, but follows
from the fact that wages set in collective agreements (minimi tabellari) are used by labour courts
as benchmarks to establish whether firms comply with Article 36 of the Italian Constitution stating
that “workers remuneration must be commensurate to quantity and quality of their work and, in
any case, such as to ensure them and their families a free and dignified existence” (Garnero, 2018).
Yet, non-compliance rates are non negligible: about 10% of workers are paid one fifth less than the
reference minimum wage, with non-compliance being higher in the South and in micro and small
firms, for women and temporary workers (again, Garnero, 2018).
Apart from the industry/national bargaining, there is also a supplementary (non compulsory)
decentralized bargaining, usually carried out at the local and/or firm level. At this level, it is possible
to negotiate performance and productivity-related wage increases. In addition, the second level
bargaining may address a number of additional issues, such as working hours, employment training,
labor organization, and union relations.
For the purposes of this paper, it is crucial to note that the second-level bargaining is subject to
the limits and provisions defined by the specific industry collective agreements. This means that it
is subject to the in melius or favourability principle, i.e. worker wages and labour conditions cannot
be worse than the ones settled at the industry level.
B The Italian housing market and the role of social housing
As many other European countries, Italian governments traditionally implement social housing
policies that could, in principle, interfere with the spontaneous market forces of offer and demand.
The European Union has no direct competence in the field, so policies of the various countries
differ remarkably (see, e.g., Scanlon and Whitehead, 2015).
According to Italian national law (D.M. 22/04/2008), social housing refers to dwellings for res-
idential use built or rehabilitated by public or private agents, also by means of public contributions
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or benefits (such as tax relieves, preferential treatments in city planning, etc), rented for at least
eight years or sold at affordable price, to fulfill housing needs of socially disadvantaged individuals
or groups of citizens.
Traditionally, social housing has consisted in three categories (see, e.g., Caruso, 2017): subsi-
dized housing (edilizia sovvenzionata), that is dwellings owned by the public sector and rented at
low rates to low-income individuals; assisted housing (edilizia agevolata), which includes dwellings
provided mainly by cooperatives and given for rent or for sale to low-medium income people;
agreed housing (edilizia convenzionata), which covers private houses offered for rent or for sale,
whose price is regulated by agreements between the house owner and the municipality.
However, despite a long tradition of public intervention in the housing market, in particular,
since the second world-war period, in the last 30 years Italian social housing policies have become
weak and very discontinuous. Starting from the ’90s, public investment in housing has fallen
dramatically due to a sharp cut in public resources devoted to this aim. Furthermore, traditional
housing policies have been largely substituted by subsidies to low-income families and other forms
of facilitation to house owners (with almost no income limits). The number of new dwellings for
assisted and agreed housing passed from 56,000 in 1984 to 11,000 in 2004, and that for subsidized
housing from 34,000 (1984) to 1900 (2004) (Anci-Cresme, 2005). In 2015, social rent in Italy was
about 5.5% in the total housing stock, that is a low percentage if compared, for instance, to 33% in
Netherlands, 18,2% in UK, 17,5% in France (Pittini et al., 2015).
Summing up, it seems that the role of the public sector in the Italian housing market has become
quite marginal and that the most recent trend in this field is that of substantially abandoning the
social housing policies as they were traditionally conceived fifty years ago. Accordingly, issues
related to social housing and public intervention in the housing markets do not seem to be relevant
in affecting our results.
C Local CPI computation procedure
Istat CPI can be defined (Istat, 2016b) as:
CPIpt =
N
∑
n=1
wntPInpt , (A1)
where PInpt is the price index of COICOP industrial category n for provincial capital city p in year
t and wnt is its relative weight at time t (equal across provincial capital cities). The CPI is equal to
100 in the base year, which is 2005 in the current analysis.
Aggregating the non-housing prices in a single category, Istat CPI can be seen as a weighted
average of just two components, the housing price index (HPI) and the non-housing price index
(NHPI), as follows:
CPIpt = wtHPIpt +(1−wt)NHPIpt , (A2)
where HPIpt is the housing price index (correspondent to COICOP04) in province capital city p
at time t, NHPIpt is the non-housing price index (all categories except COICOP04), and wt is the
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official weight attached to housing prices.
This index, to be useful to our purposes, should be modified in two ways: first, it should reflect
the “adjusted” weight that incorporates both the direct (cost of having an accommodation) and the
indirect (attraction of housing prices on non-housing prices) effect of housing prices on the cost of
living (as explained in Subsection 3.2); second, it should capture local (LLM or municipality level)
variability of prices. We do this in two steps following Moretti (2013).
As a first step, we need to substitute wt for the “adjusted” weight. Accordingly, we split the
NHPI dynamics in two components, one correlated to the dynamics of HPI and the other orthogonal
to it:
NHPIpt = piHPIpt + γpt , (A3)
where pi captures the attraction effect of housing prices on non-housing prices and γpt is an error
term. By substituting (A3) in (A2), we get:
CPIpt = [wt +(1−wt)pi]HPIct +(1−wt)γpt , (A4)
that, defining β = [w+(1−w)pi], where w is the average of wt over time, and εpt = (1−w)γpt , can
be approximated by:
CPIpt = βHPIpt + εpt . (A5)
β is the “adjusted” weight that incorporates both the direct (w) and the indirect ([(1−w)pi)
effect of housing prices on the cost of living. It is estimated by running the following OLS equation
regression:
CPIpt = dp+βHPIpt + εpt , (A6)
where dp are the province fixed effects, CPIpt is Istat provincial consumer price index, with base
year t=2005, and HPIpt is the province average housing price index, also with base year t=2005,
obtained as explained later in this subsection. We estimate equation (A6) by OLS for 103 provinces
over the 2004-2015 period and obtain a coefficient βˆ equal to 0.33 (s.e. equal to 0.0336), which
corresponds to a weight of about 33% to be compared with the official weight attached from Istat
to housing costs, in the same period, that is 10%.
As a second step, we employ the estimated “adjusted” weight, βˆ , to compute the local CPI
exploiting local variation in the housing prices as follows
ˆCPImt = βˆHPImt +(1− βˆ )NHPIt , (A7)
where HPImt is the housing price index in municipality m and year t and NHPIt is the national non-
housing price index, with base year 2005. The price index obtained as just described is computed
also at the LLM level as a population weighted average of the municipality index.
Housing data from Italian Revenue Agency (2015) (original sources of the survey data are hous-
ing agencies, estimates by Italian Revenue Agency, auctions, and courts) are detailed by semester
(January-June/July-December), city district (central, semi-central, peripheral, suburban, and extra-
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urban), type of house (“villa” cottage, “abitazione signorile” expensive house, “abitazione civile”
standard house, “abitazione economica” cheap house, “abitazione tipica del luogo” typical house),
and house status (good, standard, poor). To compute the average price for a given municipality in a
given year, we implement the following methodology, which is designed to purge the price data of
composition effects. Accordingly, we first compute the residuals from an OLS equation regression
of house prices on district, house type, status, and semester dummies; then, we take the average
residuals for each year and municipality; finally, we add the average residuals to the Italian average
of housing prices across municipalities and years. In the last two steps, the mean is weighted by
local population size. The same procedure is repeated at the province level by year to obtain the
provincial average also used in the analysis.33
Since consumer prices are expressed as index numbers (base year 2005, as we said), we also
need to convert housing prices into indexes, HPImt . In order to exploit both the time and the
territorial variation, we compute the housing price index, HPImt , in municipality m at time t as the
ratio between the housing price in LLM c at time t and its population weighted average at time
t = 2005 across LLM.
The methodology to compute non-housing price index follows Boeri et al. (2017) and, exploit-
ing Istat (2016b) data, relies on the assumption that the price component that is orthogonal to hous-
ing prices displays uniform dynamics across different regional areas and consists in computing the
weighted average of the national prices included in Istat CPI at the one-digit COICOP classification
level, excluding housing (COICOP04), weights being taken from Istat weighting scheme:
NHPIt =
1
(1−wt)
N
∑
n=1
wntPInt , (A8)
where PInt is the national price index of COICOP category in n and year t, and wnt the relative
weight.
33In a robustness check (see Section 10), we also replicate our results employing an index of housing prices in
which we do not purge the data of the composition effects as here illustrated (hence, the housing prices are population
weighted averages of housing prices (quotazioni) as provided by OMI dataset, not the residuals).
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